The Value of Earth Observation for Managing the Great Barrier Reef by Bouma, J.A. et al.
  
 
 
The Value of Earth Observation for Managing the Great 
Barrier Reef 
 
 
Jetske Bouma,a Onno Kuika and Arnold Dekkerb 
 
a. Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 
HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, corresponding author: jetske.bouma@ivm.vu.nl 
b. CSIRO Land & Water, Canberra, Australia 
 
Abstract 
Effective decision-making requires information, but how much information is 
enough and how much money should be invested in additional information is often 
unclear. This paper attempts to assess the economic benefits of informational 
investments, specifically of investments in Earth Observation (EO) for managing the 
Great Barrier Reef. We develop an expert elicitation approach based on Bayesian 
Decision Theory to estimate the expected contribution of informational investments 
to decision-making. We hypothesize that EO can improve decision-making by 
allowing for better-targeted emission reduction measures in the Great Barrier Reef 
(GBR) lagoon. For assessing the benefits (cost savings) of improved targeting we 
develop a model to optimize emission reductions under different states: emissions 
from all catchments may affect reef quality, or emissions from certain catchments 
may affect reef quality more. The states reflect the current uncertainties relating to 
water quality management in the region. The analysis suggests that the expected 
benefits of EO information for managing the GBR can be substantial, and depend on 
the perceived accuracy of EO information and on decision-makers prior beliefs. 
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1. Introduction 
In its report on the role of global Earth Observation (EO) for coral reef protection, the 
Integrated Global Observing Strategy (2003) argues that further investments in EO 
information are required to improve coral reef protection worldwide. The Strategy 
makes no attempt, however, to determine the amount of additional investments 
needed or to quantify the benefits associated with better-protected reefs. Evaluating 
costs and benefits is important for determining optimal investment levels and 
convince policy-makers that investments are indeed required. Few studies have, 
however, quantitatively assessed the economic benefits of EO information or, for that 
matter, evaluated the economic value of information for environmental management 
at all.  
A short review of the literature suggests that the value of information literature is 
limited, and that few empirical estimates of the benefits of information exist. 
Traditionally, value-of-information studies focused on the value of weather 
information for agricultural production and management (Nordhaus and Popp 1997). 
Recently, the scope of studies has broadened by addressing the value of information 
on a broad range of stochastic events such as the El Niño-southern oscillation, the oil 
price disasters, forest fires, geomagnetic storms, and the internet (see Macauley, 2006, 
for an overview). A number of studies assessed the value of information in the field of 
environmental resource management, for example Gjerde et al. 1999 and Nordhaus 
and Popp 1997 in the area of global warming, and Borisova et al. 2005 in the area of 
water quality management. The value of EO for environmental resource management 
was assessed by Kaiser and Pulsipher 2004, Chiabai and Nunes 2006, and Isik et al. 
2005, among others. Most of these studies compare decision-making under 
uncertainty with decision-making under perfect information, interpreting the 
difference as the value of information. This basically assumes that decision-makers 
use all information available and that information is perfect.  
In this paper we argue that Bayesian decision theory is a more appropriate analytical 
framework. In Bayesian decision theory the value of information is determined by the 
extent to which decision-makers actually use the information to update their beliefs. 
This depends on the content and availability of the information, the perceived 
accuracy of the information and the prior belief decision makers have (Hirshleifer and 
Riley 1979). We examine the suitability of Bayesian decision theory in the case of EO 
investment for improved water quality monitoring in the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) 
lagoon, in order to better support management of the coral reef. 
We are not the first to apply Bayesian decision theory for assessing the value of 
information. Bayesian decision theory is, for example, also used in the medical and 
health risk literature to estimate the value of information, but due to inherent 
difficulties in modeling the complexities of decision-making processes, it’s use has 
been limited (Yokota and Thompson 2004). In this paper, we reduce the complexity 
of decision-making by assuming discrete probabilities instead of continuous 
probability functions, and by focusing the analysis on only two possible actions and 
two possible states of the world. Also, due to the inherent difficulties in measuring 
decision-makers’ prior belief functions (Rabin 1998), few empirical applications of 
Bayesian decision theory exist. Lybbert et al. (2006) assess whether African 
pastoralists use weather forecasts to update their beliefs and Schimmelpfennig and 
Norton (2003) apply Bayesian decision theory to assess whether policy makers use 
the outcomes of economic research to change their decision-making. Both studies 
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assess impacts ex post, asking decision-makers to express their expectation before and 
after receiving the additional information (Lybbert et al. 2006) or asking them to 
directly express how certain information changed their beliefs (Schimmelpfennig and 
Norton 2003). In this study, we assess the value of information ex ante, since it is the 
expected value of information that determines whether informational investments are 
made. Given that decision-makers are usually unaware of their prior belief function, 
asking them ex ante how information might change their decision-making is unlikely 
to generate trustworthy results (Rabin 1998). Hence, we focus our analysis on 
assessing decision-makers’ perceptions of informational accuracy, which is the other 
factor determining whether decision-makers are likely to update their beliefs. We 
illustrated our approach previously in Bouma et al. (2009), but in this study decision-
makers prior beliefs were clear: Bouma et al. (2009) assess the value of EO for 
preventing potential harmful algal blooms in the North Sea, using the probability of 
potentially harmful algal blooms as indicating the prior belief of decision-makers, also 
because this was the probability to which all respondents referred. This is very 
different in the case of water quality management in the Great Barrier Reef lagoon. 
Here, the added value of EO information lies not in early warning, but in better 
targeting of emission reduction investments. Prior beliefs regarding the spatial 
variability of pollution impacts are not well established, and neither are they shared. 
Under these conditions, applying Bayesian Decision Theory is more difficult, and 
prior beliefs have to be deducted from actual decision-making, in line with Lybbert et 
al. (2006).  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the case study. 
Section 3 presents the conceptual framework and in section 4 we elaborate the water 
pollution abatement cost model we developed to estimate abatement costs. Section 5 
describes our empirical approach for the elicitation of decision-makers’ perceptions 
and in section 6 we present the results. Section 7 discusses the outcomes of the 
assessment and concludes. 
2. The case study 
The GBR is the largest coral reef system on earth, stretching 2000 km along the coast 
of Queensland, Australia, and covering 348,000 km2. Part of the GBR is designated a 
protected marine park and the entire reef has been declared a World Heritage site to 
recognize it’s exceptional diversity and ecological value. Twenty-six major river 
basins, comprising 25% of the land area of Queensland, discharge into the GBR 
lagoon, climatically ranging from the wet tropics to semi-arid dry zones. Land use 
differs between the catchments, agriculture (i.e. sugar cane and horticulture) being the 
predominant form of land use in the wet tropics and grazing being the predominant 
form of land use in the semi-arid zones. Both agriculture and grazing are affecting 
water quality in the GBR lagoon, nutrient loads having increased 10-20 times since 
European settlement (Wooldridge et al. 2006). Besides nutrients, sediment and 
pesticide are causing damage to the reef (Brodie et al. 2008a, 2008b) and in 2001 a 
major plan, the Great Barrier Reef Water Quality Action Plan, was developed to 
improve the quality of water flowing from adjacent catchments into the lagoon.  
The Great Barrier Reef Water Quality Action Plan is based on historical increases in 
sediment, nutrient and pesticide loads: Catchments with stark increases in sediment 
and nutrient run-off have higher reduction targets than other catchments (GBRMPA 
2001). Emission reduction targets range from 33 to 50% and interventions are 
voluntary and mostly targeted at reducing sediment and nutrient emissions from the 
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cane and horticulture sector and from grazing. Since in the Northern region of the 
GBR catchment agricultural development is still limited, interventions focus mainly 
on the 21 catchments located in the middle (wet) and southern (dry) part of the GBR 
catchment. Our analysis will therefore concentrate on these catchments too.  
Table 1 presents an overview of catchment characteristics and of the emission 
reduction targets set per catchment in the Great Barrier Reef Water Quality Action 
Plan. 
 Table 1  Characterization of catchments with targets of GBR water quality 
action plan. 
 River basin Type Total 
area 
Sugar 
cane   
Grazing   Sediment 
emissions  
Nutrient 
emissions  
TSS 
target 
DIN 
target 
    km2 km2 km2  TSS (ton)  DIN (ton) % % 
Baffle creek Dry 3996 14 3495 103376 874 50 33 
Burdekin  Dry 130126 193 128640 2443232 11134 50 33 
Burnett  Dry 33248 231 27944 728607 1244 50 33 
Calliope  dry 2236  0 2032 60772 235 50 33 
Fitzroy  dry 142537 0 124732 2635482 6579 50 33 
Kolan  dry 2901 161 2349 61589 444 50 33 
Styx  dry 3012  0 2961 136000 642 50 33 
Boyne  dry 2590  0 2226 16974 314 33 33 
Prosperine  wet 2535 196 2070 227314 1169 50 50 
Plane creek wet 2539 549 1830 114860 1612 50 50 
Pioneer  wet 1570 296 1166 288343 471 50 50 
O'Conell  wet 2387 264 1904 366309 1666 50 50 
Johnstone  wet 2325 394 493 305142 1849 50 50 
Tully  wet 1683 247 316 88084 1303 33 50 
Rusell-
Mulgrave wet 1983 232 55 222425 1441 33 50 
Murray  wet 1107 58 520 17098 440 33 50 
Mossman  wet 466 57 15 15131 231 33 50 
Herbert  wet 9843 691 7330 664787 1588 33 50 
Haughton  wet 4044 528 3441 172454 801 33 50 
Don  wet 3695 47 3582 509528 812 33 33 
Barron wet 2902 76 227 45877 321 33 33 
DIN : Dissolved inorganic nitrogen, TSS: Total suspended sediment. Source: GBRMPA (2001).  
Targeting investments to catchments, and regions within catchments, that most affect 
reef quality would probably be more efficient, but uncertainties regarding the linkages 
between land use, water quality and reef quality are large (Wooldridge et al. 2006, 
Brodie et al. 2008a, b). EO could reduce this uncertainty by increasing insight into the 
spatial and temporal distribution of certain water quality indicators in the GBR 
lagoon. Currently, ecological and water quality information concerning the GBR is 
scarce: Although in-situ measurements of certain parameters are available, due to its 
sheer size coverage for the entire reef is low (Prange et al. 2007). More EO 
information about water quality would make it possible to better target emission 
reduction measures to the catchments that most affect reef’s quality, which could help 
reef protection and reduce water management costs. 
Basically, there are four informational services that EO delivers to support water 
quality management in the GBR lagoon: a) Land use and land cover monitoring, b) 
sediment discharge and river plume monitoring, c) chlorophyll-a monitoring and d) 
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seagrass monitoring. The contribution of land cover and land use information is to 
help target sediment and nutrient emission reduction measures within catchments: 
Land cover and land use are important determinants of erosion rates and better 
information about land cover improves model predictions of sediment and nutrient 
flows (Kinsey-Henderson et al. 2007). River plume and chlorophyll-a information 
helps to improve targeting between catchments, as better information about the flow 
of sediments and chlorophyll-a from catchments makes it possible to determine which 
catchments are likely to most affect the reef (Haynes et al. 2007, Steven et al. 2007). 
Information about seagrass coverage helps targeting of measures between catchments, 
as it gives an indication of which parts of the reef most require protection from poor 
water quality. In this paper we focus on the contribution of EO sediment and 
chlorophyll-a information, since we are interested in between catchments targeting 
and since EO sea grass applications are still in an experimental stage. 
Indications of what better targeting of water quality interventions in the GBR 
catchment may imply can be found in the scientific literature. With respect to 
sediment reduction, McKergow et al. (2005) argue that most of the sediment comes 
from two catchments, the Fitzroy and the Burdekin basin, and that targeting 
interventions to these regions is most effective for improving water quality in the 
GBR lagoon. With regard to nutrient emissions, the emerging consensus seems to be 
that nutrient emission measures are most effective in the wet tropical regions of the 
GBR catchment. Devlin and Brodie (2005), Wooldridge et al. (2006) and Fabricius 
(2005) show that the inner southern reefs of the Whitsunday group and the Wet 
tropics are most affected by high nutrient levels, and targeting nutrient reduction 
measures to the wet tropical regions seems most effective for avoiding further coral 
reef loss. Greiner et al. (2005) combine the different insights into an ecological 
impact indicator which uses information about relative catchment loads, river flow 
and flood regimes together with information about reef circumference and ecosystem 
health. We will use the Greiner et al. indicator as a proxy for the more targeted water 
quality management approach. 
Estimates of the full costs of reaching the Great Barrier Reefs Water Quality Action 
Plan’s targets are not available. For individual GBR catchments, studies of the costs 
of pollution abatement are available (see for example Roebeling et al. 2009, Rolfe et 
al. 2009, Van Grieken et al. 2008), which indicate that the costs of reaching the 
targets are substantial and that the costs of pollution abatement are much higher in the 
grazing sector, than in horticulture and cane (Roebeling et al. 2009, Rolfe et al. 2009). 
In the cane sector, for example, emission reductions of 20% are possible without any 
additional costs. Better targeting of measures between sectors and catchments can 
generate substantial cost savings, but decision-makers are uncertain about possible 
adverse effects. Investment in EO could help reduce this uncertainty. In the remainder 
of this paper we analyse under which conditions additional investments in EO make 
sense.  
3. Conceptual Framework  
Bayesian decision theory is concerned with decision-making under uncertainty. When 
decision-making is uncertain, decision-makers have to act upon their beliefs regarding 
the possible states-of-the-world. The states-of-the-world may be something like “it 
rains” or “it is dry” and decision-makers attach a certain probability “pis” to each 
expected state of the world (Σpi=1). The role of information is that it gives a message 
“m” about the state of the world. Based on the informational message the decision-
 7
maker can “update” her beliefs about the state-of-the-world and, perhaps, change her 
decision (“take an umbrella”), or not. The value of information, then, depends on the 
extent to which the decision-maker updates her beliefs and the impact this has on the 
expected utility of decision-making. A formal way of expressing the process of belief 
updating is reflected in the well-known Bayes’ theorem:  
with pis,m the posterior probability, or the updated belief, pis the prior probability, or the 
belief before the additional information, qm,s the conditional probability of receiving 
message m given state s, and qm the unconditional probability of receiving 
informational message m. The unconditional probability of receiving message m is 
related to the conditional probabilities (of receiving message m in state s) by:  
∑
=
=
S
s
ssmm qq
1
,
pi  (2) 
Hence, whether an informational message succeeds in making a decision-maker 
change her belief depends upon the decision-maker’s prior belief regarding the 
possible state-of-the-world and the perceived accuracy of the informational message. 
The ‘value’ of message m is simply the difference between the utility of the action 
that is chosen given message m (xm) and the action that would have been chosen 
without additional information (x0):      
),(),(
,, msomsmm xuxu pipi −=∆  (3) 
The states referred to reflect the situation that decision-makers are uncertain about. In 
the case of water quality management in the GBR lagoon, for example, there is 
uncertainty as to which catchments should be targeted to optimally protect the coral 
reef. If the state-of-the-world is that emissions from all catchments affect the 
condition of the reef, the optimal policy is to invest in water quality improvement in 
all catchments discharging into the GBR lagoon. However, if the actual state-of-the-
world is that only emissions from certain catchments affect the reef’s condition, the 
optimal policy is to target these catchments first. Since we do not know in advance 
which message the information service will produce, the expected value of the 
information is the expected difference in utilities of actions given the likelihoods of 
receiving messages m (qm): [ ]),(),()()(
,, msomsm
m
mm xuxuqE pipiµ −=∆=∆ ∑  (4) 
∆(µ) is the expected utility of the new information, and can thus be used as an 
indicator of the value of this information, or the decision-maker’s maximum 
willingness to pay.  
Applying Bayesian decision theory to the case of water quality management in the 
GBR lagoon first requires defining the alternative actions and possible states-of-the-
world. Although a whole range of alternative actions would be possible, we simplify 
the decision-making problem to two alternative actions and two possible states-of-the-
world. With regard to the potential actions we define action x1) as reducing pollution 
from all catchments proportionally (non-targeting) , and action x2) as reducing 
pollution from some catchments proportionally more than from others (targeting). 
With regard to the ‘states-of nature’ we assume s1) there is no spatial variability in the 
impacts of pollution, and s2) there is spatial variability in the impacts of pollution. 
The simplified decision-making problem is illustrated in table 2. 
m
ssm
ms q
q
m
ssm
ms
pi
pi ,
, )Pr(
)Pr()|Pr()|Pr( ===  (1) 
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Table 2  Pay-off matrix of the decision-making problem. 
 Actions (x)  
States (s) x1: Non-targeting x2: Targeting 
S1: No spatial variability in impacts Payoff (x1|S1) Payoff (x2|S1) 
S2: Spatial variability in impacts Payoff (x1|S2) Payoff (x2|S2) 
In principle, pay-offs should reflect the net benefits of interventions, i.e., the benefits 
in terms of the economic value of better reef quality minus the costs of pollution 
abatement. Estimating these benefits is difficult, however, because of a number of 
reasons relating to uncertainty on dose-effect relationships and uncertainty with 
respect to the marginal valuation of the reef. Hence, we take a somewhat simplifying, 
cost-effectiveness approach assuming that the environmental effectiveness of actions 
is fixed, but that better informed decision-making can reduce water quality 
management costs. In the next sections we further explain our approach. 
4. Water pollution abatement costs 
We estimated water pollution abatement costs with a cost-minimization model that 
was developed for this study, written in the programming language GAMS. Given an 
exogenous environmental target, the model computes the least-cost abatement policy 
across catchments and crops. In the model we distinguish between 2 pollutants, 21 
catchments and 2 crops. The two pollutants are dissolved inorganic nitrogen (DIN) 
and total suspended sediment (TSS); the two crops are sugar cane and other crops 
(mainly grazing). The objective function of the model is: 
( )∑∑∑=
r i
pripri
p
a
afAC min  
                    (5) 
AC= Total abatement cost 
f(a) = Abatement cost for pollutant p from crop i in catchment r as function of 
abatement intensity a.     
The abatement cost is minimized given a constraint on the effectiveness of the 
abatement policy on the protection of the Reef. The effectiveness is the product of the 
total pollution flowing into the GBR lagoon and an “ecological impact” indicator that 
determines the relative damage of pollutants from different catchments. We use one 
constraint for each pollutant. In formula: 
∑ ∑=
r i
pripriprp aPvA *  
                         (6) 
 Āp = Total abatement target for pollutant p = {DIN, TSS} 
vpr =  Ecological impact indicator of pollutant p from catchment r 
Ppri = Current pollution levels of pollutant p from catchment r and crop i. 
Data on current pollution levels of DIN and TSS per catchment were taken from the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA 2001). For the allocation of 
pollution across sugar cane and other crops we estimated pollution coefficients 
(tonnes per km2) for sugar cane from the work of Roebeling et al. (2009) for the wet 
tropics, and van Grieken (2008) for the dry tropics. Pollution from other crops was 
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estimated by subtracting pollution from sugar cane production from total pollution 
loads per catchment as presented in GBRMPA (2001).  
We estimated quadratic abatement cost functions for DIN and TSS from sugar cane 
and grazing from the results of Roebeling et al. (2009). Because the cost data in 
Roebeling et al. relate to one catchment in the wet tropics (the Tully-Murray 
catchment), we compared the cost data with data from other studies from other 
catchments (Rolfe et al. 2009; Donaghy et al. 2007, Lu et al. 2004), both from the wet 
and dry tropics. The analysis did not suggest major differences in abatement cost 
functions between different catchments. Therefore we applied the Roebeling et al. 
abatement cost functions to all catchments. In accordance to Roebeling et al., in our 
model we set a maximum percentage of 80% to DIN abatement and a maximum of 
60% to TSS abatement per crop and per catchment.  
To distinguish between the states of the world, we assume that in the first state 
pollution loads discharged by the different catchments fully affect the reef (impact 
factor 1). In the second state, we assume that pollution loads from some catchments 
affect reef quality more (impact factor >1) and from other catchments affect reef 
quality less (<1). We use the ecological impact factors of Greiner et al. (2005) as a 
proxy for the second state of the world. To reach the same amount of total emission 
reduction, we rescale the impact factors.1 Table 3 presents the ecological impact 
factors per catchment and per pollutant. 
Table 3  Ecological impact factors per catchment.  
 Greiner et al. (2005) Re-scaled: impact TSS* Re-scaled: impact DIN* 
Baffle creek 0.59 0.43 0.46 
Burdekin  1.69 1.24 1.31 
Burnett  1.24 0.91 0.96 
Calliope  0.7 0.51 0.54 
Fitzroy  1.51 1.10 1.17 
Kolan 0.37 0.27 0.29 
Styx  0.66 0.48 0.51 
Boyne 0.5 0.37 0.39 
Prosperine 1.03 0.75 0.80 
Plane creek 1.37 1.00 1.06 
Pioneer 1.07 0.78 0.83 
O'Conell  1.14 0.83 0.88 
Johnstone 1.41 1.03 1.09 
Tully  1.13 0.83 0.88 
Rusell-mulgrave 1.03 0.75 0.80 
Murray  0.79 0.58 0.61 
Mossman 0.56 0.41 0.43 
Herbert 0.96 0.71 0.75 
Haughton 0.79 0.58 0.61 
Don 0.72 0.53 0.56 
Barron  0.49 0.36 0.38 
 Re-scaled (per pollutant) with scale factor α such that ∑ 1· Ri = ∑ α· GIFi·Ri, where Ri is reduction 
target for catchment i in the GBRMPA and GIFi is Greiner’s Impact Factor for catchment i.      
 
                                                 
1
 Rescaling procedure is explained underneath Table 3.  
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We carried out four simulations. The first simulation is a cost-effective abatement 
policy under the assumption of equal ecological damage from the pollution from all 
catchments (i.e. ecological impact factor for all catchments is equal to 1). At the 
overall and catchment level this simulation resembles the abatement policy plan of 
GBRMPA, the Great Barrier Reef Water Quality Action Plan, although there are 
(minor) differences in abatement rates for individual catchments. The second 
simulation is a cost-effective simulation under the assumption of different ecological 
damages from the pollution from different catchments, using the re-scaled ecological 
impact factors presented in table 3. Hence, abatement levels are higher in those 
catchments that are believed to cause more harm to the Reef. We will call this policy 
approach “targeting” (i.e. abatement effort is targeted to those catchments that cause 
most damage). In the third and fourth simulations, the policies from the first and 
second simulations are carried out, but now the ‘perceived’ ecological impact factors 
differ from the ‘real’ ones. Hence, in the third simulation, the first (no-targeting) 
policy is implemented, while in fact damage from a unit of pollution differs from 
catchment to catchment. In this case, the intensity of abatement may have to be 
adjusted to meet the overall pollution targets. In the fourth simulation, a targeting 
approach is followed, while in fact there is no difference in damage from pollution 
from different catchments. Table 4 presents the total costs of abatement per 
simulation.       
Table 4 Total abatement cost of the four simulations (million AUD/year). 
 X1 X2 
S1 1471 1521 
S2 1531 1392 
Of the four options, abatement cost is lowest with a policy of targeting when in fact 
there is spatial variability in impacts (X2|S2: AUSD 1,392 million per year). 
Abatement cost of this policy is much higher however when there is no spatial 
variability (X2|S1: AUSD 1,521 million per year). With a non-targeting policy, 
abatement cost is lowest with no spatial variability (X1|S1: AUSD 1,471 million per 
year) and highest with spatial variability (X1|S2: AUSD 1,531 million per year). 
Which policy would be best depends on the probabilities of the states, to which we 
will now turn.  
5. Prior beliefs and the perceived accuracy of information  
To estimate the extent to which information is used to update decision-makers’ 
beliefs, we need to know the prior beliefs and the perceived “accuracy” of the 
message, i.e. the conditional probability of message m given state s. (equation 2) Most 
decision-makers are not well aware of their current belief system, and have 
difficulties expressing their beliefs regarding the different states-of-the-world. Prior 
belief functions can, however, to some extent also be deducted from past decisions. 
We will return to this issue later. First, we concentrate our efforts on assessing the 
perceived accuracy of the information, or the conditional probability of message m 
given state s. Basically, what we are trying to assess here are, in statistical terms, the 
type-I and type-II errors associated with informational message ‘m’. A type-I error 
occurs when an informational message incorrectly rejects the ‘true’ state and a type-II 
error occurs if the informational message fails to reject the ‘false’ state. This is 
something decision-makers can make an estimate of, as the results of 
Schimmelpfennig and Norton (2003) and Bouma et al. (2009) show.  
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To elicit decision-makers’ perceptions of the accuracy of EO information, we 
developed a questionnaire in close cooperation with CSIRO Land & Water, the 
University Queensland and the Queensland Environmental Protection Agency. To 
assess the perceived type-I errors we asked respondents to give an indication of the 
present (without EO) and expected future (with EO) ‘informedness’ of decision-
making, ‘informedness’ referring to the certainty with which decisions are being 
made. The type-I error of EO information was then determined as the remaining 
uncertainty, or 1- the expected ‘informedness’ of decision-making with access to EO. 
To determine the type-II errors, we inquired about the perceived accuracy of EO 
information, or the probability that EO indicates, for example, a certain type of land 
cover (or sediment level, chlorophyll-a level or seagrass cover) when this is in reality 
not the case.  
Prior to the questions, we informed respondents about the potential informational EO 
services, presenting respondents with EO images regarding land cover, river plumes, 
chlorophyll-a concentrations and seagrass cover and a short, explanatory text. Also, 
we asked some questions about the respondent’s background, about their beliefs and 
expectations with regard to EO and about the importance of water quality 
management. Finally, we asked respondents to state their confidence in their answers 
and evaluate the questionnaire. We sent the questionnaire to approximately 70 
researchers, water managers and policy-makers concerned with the management of 
the GBR. Respondents were selected by CSIRO on the basis of their position (e.g. 
role in water quality management) and exposure to EO. Explicit attention was paid to 
respondent representation from research and policy circles and direct or indirect 
involvement in the management of the GBR. We sent the questionnaire around mid 
May 2008, and respondents had till mid July to respond. By the time the deadline 
closed, 27 respondents had replied, or approximately 40%.  
Of these 27 respondents, 42% were policy-makers and water managers directly 
involved in GBR-, water quality- and/or catchment-management, 31% were 
researchers and 27% of the respondents described themselves as somewhere in 
between. With regard to the respondents’ background in environmental monitoring 
and use of EO information, 92% of the respondents indicated having considerable 
experience with environmental monitoring. With respect to EO, all respondents 
indicate having had some exposure, but only 31% had had considerable experience 
with EO, 38% of the respondents some and 31% of the respondents little experience 
(of which 4% none).  
All respondents gave estimates of what they perceived to be the informedness of 
decision-making, and most respondents were confident about the estimates they gave. 
Researchers, and those with most EO experience, were more confident than managers 
and people with little EO experience, but even the least confident were quite confident 
about the answers they gave. Hence, even for a complex environmental decision-
making problem like the one addressed in this study decision-makers seemed able to 
express what they believe to be the accuracy of information.  
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Table 5  Results of the questionnaire*.  
 Overall Land 
cover 
River  
plume 
Water  
Quality** 
Sea  
grass 
Present 'informedness'a of decision-making  44 % (17.3) 
41% 
(15.5) 
42% 
(16.8) 
45% 
(18.3) 
49% 
(18.1) 
Future 'informedness'b of decision-making 72% (13.5) 
73% 
(12.8) 
72% 
(16.7) 
72% 
(11.9) 
72% 
(12.6) 
Impact of EO on ‘informedness’ of decision-making 28% (16.7) 
32% 
(14.7) 
30% 
(18.7) 
27% 
(15.2) 
23% 
(17.4) 
Accuracy of EOc 65% (16.2) 
65% 
(16.9) 
67% 
(18.3) 
66% 
(16.6) 
62% 
(13.1) 
*
 Standard deviations between brackets, ** chlorophyll-a 
a We asked respondents: ‘If 100% represents a situation of fully informed decision-making regarding X 
and 0% represents a situation with no information, what do you believe to be the ‘informedness’ of 
decision-making if decision-makers have NO access to satellite observation (thus would rely solely on 
in situ measurements)? 
b We asked respondents: ‘ Now, with full access to satellite imagery derived X information, what do 
you believe the situation to be, i.e. how well-informed is decision-making then?’ 
c We asked respondents ‘Given an image like X, what do you expect to be the probability that the 
satellite-based information indicates low water clarity when ‘in situ’ measurements indicate water 
clarity is good? (i.e. the accuracy of satellite-based river plume information)  
Interpreting 1- the future informedness of decision-making as the type-I error of EO, 
the perceived type-I errors of having a monitoring system with additional EO 
investment are approximately 28%. For an indication of the perceived type-II error of 
an EO enhanced monitoring system we used the accuracy estimate itself. Due to 
unclear wording we encountered some difficulties in the interpretation of results. 
Some respondents gave estimates for the perceived accuracy of EO information 
(generally, in the range of 50-100%) whereas other respondents gave estimates for the 
probability of EO information being wrong (in the range of 0-50%). We corrected the 
second set of answers by subtracting all estimates below 50% from 100%, and 
checked outcomes with the maximum accuracy estimates respondents gave later in 
the questionnaire. 
Testing for the influence of the respondent’s background and level of EO experience, 
we find that when grouping respondents by professional background, there are no 
significant differences in ‘informedness’ estimates between groups. When we group 
respondents by their experience with EO information there are significant differences 
between groups (5% significance level, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test), but 
groups only differ in their estimates of the current ‘informedness’ of decision-making, 
and not in their estimates of the future ‘informedness’of decision-making. Since it are 
the future ‘informedness’ estimates we are interested in, we can use the average 
figures for our analysis. Also, since the estimates for EO river plume and EO water 
quality information are roughly the same, we can use one estimate for both (i.e. a 
type-I error of 28% and a type-II error of 34%). 
As a final step in estimating the value of EO for managing water quality in the GBR 
lagoon, we need to deduce decision-makers’ beliefs regarding the current ‘state-of-
the-world’. As indicated earlier, decision-makers are unlikely to be able to express 
their prior beliefs regarding the different states-of-the-world, so we need to deduct 
these probabilities from actual decision-making. Assuming decision-makers are 
rational, the actions decision-makers take implicitly reflect their prior beliefs. With 
information about the expected utility of the alternative actions, this makes it possible 
to explicitly distinguish the prior beliefs. Given the fact that decision-makers are 
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currently choosing action x1, the expected utility of action x should exceed the 
expected utility of action x2. Table 6 presents the expected utility of the different 
actions under the different states (NB expected utilities are negative because we are 
talking about costs).  
Table 6.  The expected utility of alternative actions under different states.  
Prior belief S1  
(%) 
Prior belief S2  
(%) 
Expected utility x1 
(million AUD) 
Expected utility x2 
(million AUD) 
90 10 -1477 -1508 
80 20 -1483 -1495 
70 30 -1489 -1482 
60 40 -1495 -1469 
50 50 -1501 -1457 
40 60 -1507 -1444 
30 70 -1513 -1431 
20 80 -1519 -1418 
10 90 -1525 -1405 
73.5 26.5 -1486.9 -1486.8 
When the prior belief in state 1 is roughly 74%, the expected utilities of action x1 and 
x2 are the same. Hence, we assume that the prior belief in state 1 is minimally 74% 
when assessing the value of information.  
6. Results  
If we indeed assume a prior belief function for state s1 of 74%, and use the type I and 
type II errors presented in table 5, the value of EO information, ∆(µ), can be 
calculated with the help of equation 4. Using the suggested parameter values, the 
value of EO information (in terms of cost savings) is 13.9 million AUD/year. It is 
important to note that this is a maximum estimate, given that when the expected 
utility of both actions is similar, decision-makers are most uncertain as to what action 
to choose. When decision-makers are more certain about their actions, the value of 
information is decreased. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship and presents the value 
of information for the whole range of prior beliefs. The figure also shows the value of 
information for the case when information is perfect, interpreting ‘perfect’ as the 
perceived maximum information accuracy, which respondents believed to be 80%. 
Finally, the figure presents the 95% certainty range of value of information estimates, 
accounting for the differences in respondent beliefs (based on standard deviations). 
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Figure 1.  The value of EO information. 
What the results presented in Figure 1 show, is that improving information accuracy 
not only increases its value, but also increases the range of prior beliefs over which 
the information has value. Whereas the least accurate information (represented by 
VOI 95% low) has only value to decision-makers with a prior belief in state 1 of 
somewhere between 60-80%, highly accurate information has a value for decision-
makers ranging from strong state 1 believers to those that think state 2 is more likely 
to represent the actual state of the world. Attaching a single value to the contribution 
of EO information is difficult, since the value of information depends on what the 
decision-maker believes. Still, the figures give a good indication of the range of dollar 
amounts decision-makers might be willing-to-pay for EO information and on what 
this value depends.  
What is still lacking from the figures are EO investment costs. Although data on the 
costs of EO investment are, unfortunately, lacking, studies have shown that the 
additional monitoring costs of EO are often negative (cost saving) or low: Bouma et 
al. (2009) indicate that EO reduces the costs of monitoring and Mumby et al. (1999) 
suggest that in the GBR region EO is most cost-effective too. Still, at low values of 
information, the additional costs may be too high, but for a range of values it seems 
worthwhile to invest in an activity that might well generate over 10 million AUD a 
year.  
7. Discussion  
We started out this paper with the aim of examining whether Bayesian decision theory 
could be used to assess the value of information for a complex environmental 
decision-making problem, having illustrated in Bouma et al. (2009) that it can be used 
to estimate the value of information for a simple decision-making problem, i.e. 
relating to early warning systems for algal bloom in the North sea.  
The analysis showed that the methodology is indeed suitable for assessing the value 
of information when decision-making is complex. In fact, it showed that even when 
the prior beliefs of decision-makers are uncertain, Bayesian decision theory can derive 
value of information estimates and generate a range of values reflecting potential 
willingness-to-pay for the informational service. What makes the approach 
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particularly interesting is that it actually quantifies how increasing the accuracy of 
information increases it’s value and also increases the range of decision-makers (with 
different beliefs) that are potentially willing to pay for the informational service. 
Although it may not be possible to exactly determine whether decision-makers attach 
a probability to state 1 of 62% or 74%, the outcomes provide a platform to discuss the 
conditions under which informational investments make economic sense. 
For future studies, we would like to also include the benefits of better targeting and 
the costs of EO investment: Clearly, we would have preferred to this in this study, but 
the data to do so unfortunately lacked. Also, we implicitly assumed that decision-
makers are risk-neutral. It could well be the case that the decision-makers in this case 
are risk averse and it would be interesting to see how this would influence our results. 
Finally, given the differences in decision-makers perceptions, it would be interesting 
to further analyze the factors influencing respondent beliefs. 
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